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FAILING TO KEEP “EASY CASES EASY”:
FLORIDA V. JARDINES REFUSES TO
RECONCILE INCONSISTENCIES IN FOURTH
AMENDMENT PRIVACY LAW BY INSTEAD
FOCUSING ON PHYSICAL TRESPASS
George M. Dery III
This Article analyzes Florida v. Jardines, in which the Supreme
Court ruled that a canine sniff of a home from the front porch was a
Fourth Amendment search. In reaching this ruling, the Court employed
the property-rights definition of a search newly recovered the prior
term in United States v. Jones instead of applying the reasonable
expectation of privacy test created in Katz v. United States. This work
examines the concerns created by Jardines’s ruling. This Article asserts
that Jardines refused to resolve a potentially troubling incongruity
between Kyllo v. United States, precedent that exalted the privacy of
the home, and United States v. Place, a case that deemed a canine sniff
to be a Fourth Amendment nonentity. Further, Jardines grafted onto its
property-rights test an undefined and complicated implied license
analysis. Finally, Jardines intensified the subjectivity of Jones’s
property-rights rule by injecting a “purpose” inquiry into its new
implied license analysis. The Court’s failure to consider the conflicts
between Kyllo and Place, its creation of a new implied license rule, and
its infusion of subjectivity into the Fourth Amendment could confuse the
police and courts burdened with applying Jardines’s ruling.

 Professor, California State University Fullerton, Division of Politics, Administration, and
Justice. Former Deputy District Attorney, Los Angeles, California; J.D., 1987, Loyola Law
School, Los Angeles; B.A., 1983, University of California, Los Angeles.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Two of the Supreme Court’s most significant Fourth
Amendment1
cases,
Kyllo
v.
United
States,2
and
United States v. Place,3 are potentially in conflict. Kyllo, which
deemed “all details” in the home to be “intimate,”4 voiced concern
over homeowners being “at the mercy of advancing technology”
which could discern human activity within a home.5 To protect the
privacy of the home, the Kyllo Court self-consciously drew a firm
and bright line “at the entrance to the house.”6 Kyllo thus held that
the government’s employment of a device not generally in public use
to explore the inner details of the home amounted to a “search” under
the Fourth Amendment.7 Meanwhile, in Place, the Court lauded the
drug-detecting dog, who sniffed baggage at an airport, for pursuing
her task without causing the embarrassment and inconvenience
occasioned by luggage searches by her human counterparts.8
Furthermore, Place was impressed by the dog’s ability to focus only
on contraband—items which, by definition, are illegal to possess—
while maintaining the privacy of noncontraband items.9 Place
therefore concluded that a “canine sniff” was so uniquely limited in
the manner in which it obtained information and in the content of the
information it gathered that it “did not constitute a ‘search’ within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”10 What would happen if a
case presented facts that combined Kyllo’s protection of privacy in

1. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
3. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
4. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 37.
5. Id. at 35–36.
6. Id. at 40.
7. Id.
8. Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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the home with Place’s determination that dog sniffs do not even
trigger the Fourth Amendment?
Such a case arose when Detective Douglas Bartelt, a canine
handler,11 took his drug-detecting dog, Franky,12 to the front door of
Joelis Jardines’s home.13 When Franky alerted to the smell of
marijuana in the house, he would ultimately cause the Court, in
Florida v. Jardines, to consider “whether using a drug sniffing dog
on a homeowner’s porch to investigate the contents of the home is a
‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”14 Curiously,
in answering this question, the Court did not even consider, let alone
resolve, the conflicting interpretations of privacy presented in Kyllo
and Place. Instead, the Jardines Court openly avoided providing any
guidance on the question, happily keeping “easy cases easy.”15
The problem with taking the easy route is that it leads one down
the wrong path. In its effort to steer clear of the differing
interpretations of Fourth Amendment privacy, Jardines employed a
test it had only recently rescued from nearly forty years of
obsolescence and disuse. One year before Jardines, the Court in
United States v. Jones16 dredged up a common law trespass
definition for Fourth Amendment searches championed in the
prohibition case, Olmstead v. United States.17 Jones defined a Fourth
Amendment search as a physical occupation of “private property for
the purpose of obtaining information.”18 Jardines adopted the Jones
test19 in deciding that use of a drug-sniffing dog to investigate a
home and its surroundings was a Fourth Amendment “search.”20
Such reasoning was not without cost. The Court left the
inconsistencies between Kyllo and Place unresolved. Further, the
Court created a new Fourth Amendment test regarding implied and
express “licenses,” which will engender confusion among the police
and courts that will be left to interpret these rules and apply the rigid
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1413 (2013).
Id. at 1421 (Alito, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1413 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id. at 1417.
132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
Id.; Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949.
Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1414.
Id. at 1417–18.
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Jones/Olmstead definition to today’s social norms.21 Finally,
Jardines increased the subjectivity of Jones’s property-rights rule by
making an officer’s intent relevant, not only to the definition of a
search but also to the license analysis.22
In Part II, this Article reviews the Court’s precedent regarding
Fourth Amendment privacy in the home, the warrant requirement
meant to protect the home, and the definition of a Fourth
Amendment search. Part III examines Jardines, exploring both its
facts and the Court’s opinion. Part IV considers the implications of
Jardines’s reasoning on the current definitions of a Fourth
Amendment “search” and its impact on those who will be called
upon to implement these changes.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Privacy of the Home and the Primacy
of the Warrant Requirement
The home occupies the center of the Fourth Amendment. At
“the very core” of the Fourth Amendment “stands the right of a man
to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable
governmental intrusion.”23 The home’s special protection under the
Fourth Amendment can be traced back to a time before the
Amendment itself ever existed. In discussing the Fourth Amendment,
the Court has quoted William Pitt’s declaration, “The poorest man
may in his cottage bid defiance to all the forces of the Crown,”
including the King himself.24 The crucial combination of privacy and
autonomy provided to the homeowner is still cherished by the Court,
which declared, “A man can still control a small part of his
environment, his house; he can retreat from outsiders, secure in the
knowledge that they cannot get at him without disobeying the
Constitution. That is a sizeable chunk of liberty—worth protecting
from encroachment.”25 It is therefore “beyond dispute that the home

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. at 1415–16.
Id. at 1416–17.
Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961).
Id.; Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307 (1958).
Silverman, 365 U.S. at 511, n.4.

FAILING TO KEEP “EASY CASES EASY”

456

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

9/25/2014 4:15 PM

[Vol. 47:451

is entitled to special protection as the center of the private lives of
our people.”26
The Court has recognized the home’s special position in a
variety of Fourth Amendment contexts. The Court protected a home
from electronic surveillance in Silverman v. United States.27 In
condemning the insertion of a “spike mike” into the wall of a house,
Silverman noted that a “sane, decent civilized society must provide
some . . . oasis, some shelter from public scrutiny, some insulated
enclosure, some enclave, some inviolate place which is a man’s
castle.”28 In Payton v. New York, the Court invalidated a warrantless
arrest in a home, finding it “‘a basic principle of Fourth Amendment
law’ that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are
presumptively unreasonable.”29 Payton declared that the Fourth
Amendment “appl[ied] to all invasions on the part of the government
and its employees” into “the sanctity of a man’s home and the
privacies of life.”30 In Wilson v. Layne, the Court held that police
violated the Fourth Amendment when they brought a photographer
into a home while executing a search warrant, since the presence of
the media was “not in aid of the execution of the warrant.”31 Layne
noted, “The Fourth Amendment embodies [a] centuries-old principle
of respect for the privacy of the home . . . .”32 In
Georgia v. Randolph, the Court held that a search pursuant to the
consent of one occupant of a home was not valid as to a present
inhabitant who expressly refused consent to police.33 In so holding,
Randolph referred back to the “ancient adage that a man’s house is
his castle”34 which has enjoyed “centuries of special protection.”35
When considering the privacy of the home, the case most
pertinent to Jardines is Kyllo v. United States.36 Justice Kagan said
26. Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 99 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
27. Silverman, 365 U.S. at 511, 512.
28. Id. at 511, n.4 (quoting United States v. On Lee, 193 F.2d 306, 315–16 (2d Cir. 1951)
(Frank, J., dissenting), aff’d, 343 U.S. 747 (1952)).
29. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 & n.25 (1980) (quoting Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 477 (1971)).
30. Id. at 585.
31. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614 (1999).
32. Id. at 610.
33. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 122–23 (2006).
34. Id. at 115 (quoting Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 307 (1958)).
35. Id. at 115 n.4.
36. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
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as much in her concurring opinion in Jardines when she declared, “If
we had decided this case on privacy grounds, we would have realized
that Kyllo v. United States already resolved it.”37 In Kyllo, an agent
from the United States Department of the Interior, suspecting that
marijuana was being grown in a Florence, Oregon triplex, pointed a
thermal imager at Danny Kyllo’s home.38 The agent was able to
perform this scan while sitting in his vehicle on the street.39 Since the
heat imager showed that the roof of Kyllo’s garage was especially
hot, the agent concluded that the homeowner was using “halide lights
to grow marijuana in his house.”40 This information formed part of
the probable cause needed to obtain a warrant, the execution of
which recovered over one hundred marijuana plants.41
The Court in Kyllo thus needed to determine if the detection of
heat using a thermal imager amounted to a “search” under the Fourth
Amendment.42 Justice Scalia, who wrote the opinion for the Kyllo
Court, reminisced that the “permissibility of visual surveillance of a
home used to be clear because, well into the 20th century, our Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence was tied to common-law trespass.”43 This
earlier caselaw measured a Fourth Amendment search by looking for
an “actual intrusion into a constitutionally protected area.”44 Justice
Scalia then made an interesting observation, in light of the opinions
he later wrote in both Jones and Jardines: “We have since decoupled
violation of a person’s Fourth Amendment rights from trespassory
violation of his property.”45 The Court had instead applied the
standard developed by “Justice Harlan’s oft-quoted concurrence,”
which defined a Fourth Amendment search as “when the government
violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society recognizes as
reasonable.”46

37. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1419 (2013) (Kagan, J., concurring).
38. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 29.
39. Id. at 29–30.
40. Id. at 30.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 31–32.
43. Id.
44. Id. (quoting Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 510–512 (1961)).
45. Id. at 32. In the opinion Justice Scalia wrote for the Jones Court, he emphasized, “the
Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the commonlaw trespassory test.” United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 952 (2012).
46. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33.
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Kyllo deemed the scanner’s measurement of heat as revealing
“intimate” details simply “because they were details of the home.”47
Justice Scalia worried that the imager “might disclose, for example,
at what hour each night the lady of the house takes her daily sauna
and bath—a detail that many would consider ‘intimate.’”48 The Court
thus concluded, “Where, as here, the Government uses a device that
is not in general public use, to explore the details of the home that
would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion,
the surveillance is a ‘search . . . .’”49
Kyllo not only concluded that thermal imaging of a home
amounted to a search, it ruled that such a search “is presumptively
unreasonable without a warrant.”50 The Court has long adhered to
such a presumption, declaring that a “search of a private dwelling
without a warrant is in itself unreasonable and abhorrent to our
laws.”51 The Court has seen this “warrant requirement” as “a
principal protection against unnecessary intrusions into private
dwellings.”52 Johnson v. United States explicitly presented the logic
behind the warrant requirement:
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not
grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law
enforcement the support of the usual inferences which
reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists
in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and
detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer
engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime.53
The Court thus established the warrant requirement with an eye
to human nature so that the rights of the Fourth Amendment could be
enforced in the real world. The Court candidly acknowledged:
“Power is a heady thing; and history shows that the police acting on
their own cannot be trusted. And so the Constitution requires a
magistrate to pass on the desires of the police before they violate the
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 38.
Id.
Id. at 40.
Id.
Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 32 (1925).
Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748 (1984).
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948).
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privacy of the home.”54 Thus, “the Constitution requires ‘that the
deliberate, impartial judgment of a judicial officer . . . be interposed
between the citizen and the police . . . .’”55 The warrant mandate has
become a Fourth Amendment foundation stone, for, as noted in
Katz v. United States,
Over and again this Court has emphasized that the mandate
of the [Fourth] Amendment requires adherence to judicial
process . . . and that searches conducted outside the judicial
process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are
per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject
only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions.56
Thus, from the time of powdered wigs to the creation of
technology that can image heat from within houses, the Fourth
Amendment has consistently protected homes from government
intrusion. Further, one of the most important tools employed to
protect the home has been the requirement that police obtain a
warrant seeking a judge’s permission before intruding on the privacy
of the home.
B. The Fourth Amendment Definition of a “Search”
The privacy of the home and the warrant requirement enforcing
it presupposes a search or a seizure, for the Fourth Amendment does
not even apply if neither a search nor seizure occurs.57 In other
words, if there is no search and there is no seizure, then there is no
need for a warrant. The Court’s definitions of “search” and “seizure”
under the Fourth Amendment thus take on great significance, for if a
particular police action falls outside of both of these definitions,
officials will not need to justify the Fourth Amendment
“reasonableness” of their behavior. In Jardines, where police brought
a dog to a home to sniff for marijuana, the Court focused on whether

54. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948).
55. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (quoting Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471, 481–481 (1963)).
56. Id. (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
57. By its own terms, the Fourth Amendment applies only to “searches and seizures.” U.S.
CONST. amend. IV.
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a “search” occurred, leading it to consider its definition of a Fourth
Amendment “search.”58
Since 2012, with the advent of United States v. Jones, there have
been two definitions of a Fourth Amendment “search.”59 Any
meaningful discussion of the two definitions, however, must begin
with the prohibition case, Olmstead v. United States, in which federal
agents overheard Olmstead’s conversations from his office and home
by wiretapping his phone lines.60 The Court in Olmstead determined
that the agents’ eavesdropping occurred “without trespass upon any
property of the defendants,”61 and therefore “[t]here was no
searching. There was no seizure.”62 The resulting rule, refined over
the decades, defined a Fourth Amendment “search” as a “physical
intrusion”63 or “physical invasion”64 of a “constitutionally protected
area,” such as a home.65 This test was not without its critics. The
Court of Appeals in Silverman believed drawing a constitutional line
between a device that physically intruded into a home and a device
that merely rested on the outside a home to be “too fine a one to
draw.”66 In response, the Silverman Court stuck to its physical
intrusion rule, with the concession that it would not go beyond it “by
even a fraction of an inch.”67
Perhaps such minute measurements contributed the Court’s
decision to abandon the Olmstead/Silverman rule in Katz v. United
States.68 As previously noted, Katz “decoupled” a Fourth
Amendment “search” from physical intrusions on constitutionally
protected areas in favor of the reasonable expectation of privacy
test.69 Katz gave Olmstead a less-than-respectful burial, announcing,

58. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013). Whether the dog’s or officers’ actions
constituted a Fourth Amendment “seizure” is beyond the scope of this Article.
59. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012) (defining search by physical intrusion in
effect for the purpose of obtaining information); Katz v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961)
(defining search by reasonable expectation of privacy).
60. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 456–57 (1928).
61. Id. at 457.
62. Id. at 464.
63. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509 (1961).
64. Id. at 510.
65. Id. at 512.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
69. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32 (2001).
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“[T]he correct solution of Fourth Amendment problems is not
necessarily promoted by incantation of the phrase ‘constitutionally
protected area.’”70 Further, the Katz Court archly intoned, “[T]he
Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.”71 As for creating a
new definition for a Fourth Amendment search, the Court in Katz
gave little guidance, broadly declaring, “Wherever a man may be, he
is entitled to know that he will remain free from unreasonable
searches and seizures.”72 Ultimately, the Katz standard came from a
two-part test Justice Harlan fashioned in his concurrence:
My understanding of the rule that has emerged from prior
decisions is that there is a twofold requirement, first that a
person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of
privacy, and second, that the expectation be one that society
is prepared to recognize as “reasonable.”73
The Court has subsequently relied on this test to decide if
searches occurred in a wide variety of contexts, such as when
government agents squeezed soft baggage on a bus,74 explored
banking records,75 and rummaged through trash left on the curb for
collection.76
One case where the Court failed to apply the typical Katz
analysis was United States v. Place. In Place, federal narcotics
agents took luggage from a deplaning passenger to a drug-detecting
dog, who, upon sniffing, “reacted positively” to bags that ultimately
proved to hold cocaine.77 In considering “if this investigative
procedure [was] itself a search,” Place harkened to Katz in noting
that the Fourth Amendment “protects people from unreasonable
government intrusions into their legitimate expectations of
privacy.”78 The Court further recognized that a person has a Fourth
Amendment “privacy interest in the contents of personal luggage.”79
Place’s reasoning then took an interesting turn, focusing not so much
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Katz, 389 U.S. at 350.
Id. at 351.
Id. at 359.
Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338–39 (2000).
United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976).
California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40–41 (1988).
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 699 (1983).
Id. at 706–07.
Id. at 707.
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on the government intrusion occasioned by a canine sniff, but on the
various invasions that did not occur with this investigative technique.
A well-trained dog’s sniff did not open luggage, expose
noncontraband items to public view, or cause embarrassment or
inconvenience.80 Although the sniff did tell authorities “something
about the contents of the luggage,” it was “much less intrusive” than
the invasive hands of a human and only disclosed evidence of
narcotics, something illegal to possess in the first place.81 Being
unaware of any other “investigative procedure that is so limited both
in the manner in which the information is obtained and in the content
of the information revealed,” Place deemed the exposure of luggage
to a trained canine’s sniff in a public place to “not constitute a
‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”82 Left
unanalyzed was the information that the dog did gather—the
existence of an item in a location where an individual did possess a
Fourth Amendment “privacy interest.”83 This analytical omission
would ultimately cause a potential conflict between Place and Kyllo,
which came to the fore in Jardines.
One more important case, however, would affect the Fourth
Amendment’s definition of a search before Franky would sniff at
Joelis Jardines’s front door. In United States v. Jones, a drug task
force placed a global positioning system (GPS) tracking device onto
a nightclub owner’s Jeep in the hopes of learning the location of his
narcotics stash.84 In determining whether attaching the GPS device
was a Fourth Amendment “search,” the Jones Court, in an opinion
authored by Justice Scalia, emphasized that the government
“physically occupied private property for the purpose of obtaining
information.”85 Despite his earlier assertion that the Court had
“decoupled” the Fourth Amendment from a trespassory violation of
property, Justice Scalia now brought back the physical intrusion
standard, declaring, “Fourth Amendment rights do not rise or fall
with the Katz formulation.”86 Indeed, Jones characterized Katz as
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 948 (2012).
Id. at 949.
Id. at 950.
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deviating from the traditional property-based approach that served
the Court well into the 20th century.87 Still, the Court in Jones did
not repudiate Katz, instead characterizing it as being “added to, not
substituted for, the common-law trespassory test.”88 On the eve of
the Jardines decision, therefore, the Court had two different
definitions of a Fourth Amendment “search.”
III. FLORIDA V. JARDINES
A. Facts
On November 3, 2006, Detective William Pedraja of the
Miami-Dade Police Department received a tip that Joelis Jardines
was growing marijuana in his home.89 On December 6, 2006, at
7:00 a.m., Detective Predaja, as part of a Drug Enforcement Agency
(DEA) task force, went to Jardines’s home.90 While Miami police
officers “established perimeter positions around the residence,” the
DEA agents provided backup.91 For fifteen minutes, Detective
Predaja observed the home and noted that “there were no vehicles in
the driveway, the window blinds were closed, and there was no
activity at the residence.”92 These observations bolstered Detective
Prejada’s suspicions that the residence was a marijuana grow house,
because persons running such houses “‘don’t want to be seen by
neighbors’ and typically have ‘no traffic’ because ‘[t]hey are not
selling or buying from that residence.’”93
Then, Detective Predaja and Detective Douglas Bartelt, along
with Bartelt’s police dog, Franky, “walked up the driveway and front
87. Id.
88. Id. at 952.
89. Detective Pedraja had received “an unverified ‘crime stoppers’ tip that the home of
Joelis Jardines was being used to grow marijuana.” Jardines v. State, 73 So. 3d 34, 37 (Fla. 2011),
aff’d, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013).
90. Detective Pedraja went to the home “along with a drug task force that included several
agents of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency.” Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 4,
Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013) (No. 11-564), 2011 WL 5254666, at *4.
91. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 2, Jardines, 133 S.
Ct. 1409 (No. 11-564), 2012 WL 1561150, at *2.
92. Id.; Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1413 (2013).
93. Brief Supporting Petitioner, supra note 91, at 2. Detective Predaja considered such
observations to be “consistent with the use of the residence as a ‘grow house’ for marijuana.” Id.
Detective Predaja was “a 17 year detective” who had spent “the last four years investigating and
unearthing marijuana cultivators in urban environments.” Brief for the State of Florida at 3 n.1,
Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (No. 11-564), 2012 WL 1594294, at *3 n.1.
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walkway of the house” to the front porch.94 Detective Bartelt was a
“trained canine handler”95 while Franky “had been trained to detect
marijuana, cocaine, heroin, hashish, methamphetamine, and
ecstasy.”96 Detective Bartelt kept Franky on a six-foot leash “owing
in part due to the dog’s ‘wild’ nature, and tendency to dart around
erratically while searching.”97 Following his training, Franky began
“bracketing” an airborne odor by moving “back and forth, back and
forth,” until he homed in on its source.98 The dog was so vigorous
that Detective Bartelt gave him as much distance as he could and
Detective Predaja stood back so as to not “get knocked over.”99
Detecting the strongest odor at the front door, Franky sat, indicating
he had found the source.100 Detective Bartelt told Detective Predaja
of Franky’s alert and then returned the dog to the car.101
Detective Predaja remained, knocking on the door and receiving
no answer.102 While there, he smelled “live marijuana” and noticed
that the house’s air conditioner constantly ran for fifteen minutes, an
indication that high intensity light bulbs used for marijuana

94. Brief for the State of Florida, supra note 93, at 4; Brief Supporting Petitioner, supra note
91, at 2.
95. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1413.
96. Brief Supporting Petitioner, supra note 91, at 2.
97. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1413. Detective Bartelt testified as follows regarding his handling
of Franky:
I, basically, approached with my canine partner. The way my canine partner
works, he is very strongly driven, so he is actually out in front of me. He is one of the
dogs that will actually pull me around very dramatically.
So he pulled directly up the front porch as he is trained to do, and immediately
upon crossing the threshold of the archway which you see here, upon entering the
alcove of the porch, he began tracking and airborne odor. . . .
[Franky’s alert] would have been the head high, tracking the airborne odor. He
began tracking that airborne odor by bracketing and tracking back and forth. . . .
Bracketing is a technique that the dog uses once he comes to an odor—which is
basically you can think of it as a cloud of odor.
Once he gets into that cloud of odor, he is trained to go to the strongest point.
We call that source.
So, he is bracketing back and forth back and forth within the cone of odor or to
determine the strongest source. In this particular residence source for him was the base
of the door.
Joint Appendix at 94–96, Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (No. 11-564); 2012 WL 1550599, at *94–96.
98. Id.
99. Detective Bartelt testified that he tended to give Franky “as much distance as I can.” Id.
100. Id.
101. Brief for the State of Florida, supra note 93, at 4.
102. Id.
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cultivation could be on inside.103 Detective Predaja left to obtain a
search warrant while “the task force remained in place in public
areas outside to secure the scene.”104 When officers executed the
warrant, they recovered over twenty-five pounds of live marijuana
plants and caught Jardines as he tried to flee through a rear door.105
Police arrested Jardines, who was charged with “trafficking in
cannabis.”106 Jardines moved to suppress the marijuana, contending
that the canine sniff amounted to an unreasonable search under the
Fourth Amendment.107 The trial court granted the motion, and the
issue worked its way through the state courts until the Court granted
certiorari on the question of “whether the officers’ behavior was a
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”108
B. The Court’s Opinion
To measure the intrusion caused by a canine sniff of a home’s
front porch, Jardines resorted to a “simple baseline:” whenever “‘the
Government obtains information by physically intruding’ on persons,
houses, papers, or effects,” a Fourth Amendment search has
occurred.109 The Court lauded this test as providing the “original
meaning” of a search, which “formed the exclusive basis” for the
Fourth Amendment’s protections “for much of our history.”110
Nearly four decades of reliance on Katz’s reasonable expectation of
privacy test for searches did “not subtract anything” from these
original protections.111
Jardines viewed physical intrusion of the home, which, when it
came to the Fourth Amendment, was “first among equals,” as
striking at the “very core” of a person’s right to “be free from
unreasonable government intrusion.”112 Although the police dog did

103. Id. at 4–5.
104. Id. at 5.
105. Id.
106. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1413 (2013). Jardines was also charged with “grand
theft for stealing over five thousand dollars of electricity from Florida Power & Light to grow the
marijuana.” Brief for the State of Florida, supra note 93, at 6.
107. Jardines, 133 S.Ct. at 1413.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1414.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
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not actually physically go into the home, he did invade the home’s
“curtilage,” defined as the area “immediately surrounding and
associated with the home.”113 Government dawdling in the curtilage
by lingering on the front porch and “trawl[ing] for evidence with
impunity” presented the Court with the distressing picture of police
observing a citizen in “his repose from just outside the front
window.”114
The Court recognized that not every physical invasion of the
front porch could trigger a “fine-grained” Constitutional analysis;
otherwise Girl Scouts and trick-or-treaters would need to be Fourth
Amendment scholars.115 Distinguishing between a search and a
social visit caused the Court to elaborate on licensed and unlicensed
physical intrusions.116 Since “the detectives had all four of their feet
and all four of their companion’s firmly planted on the
constitutionally protected extension of Jardines’[s] home, the only
question is whether he had given his leave (even implicitly) for them
to do so.”117 Any such license could be “implied from the habits of
the country.”118 One implied license “typically permits the visitor to
approach the home by the front path, knock promptly, wait briefly to
be received, and then (absent invitation to linger longer) leave.”119
This license not only imposes the two limits of place (arrive by front
path) and time (leave after brief wait), but also the limit as to
“specific purpose.”120 The detectives in Jardines outstripped any
license when they brought a “trained police dog to explore the area
around the home in hopes of discovering incriminating evidence.”121
The mention of “purpose” exposed the Court to criticism that it
was injecting an element of “subjective intent” into its Fourth
Amendment analysis, an approach counter both to Court precedent122
and the explicit reasonableness language of the Fourth

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1415.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting McKee v. Gratz, 260 U.S. 127, 136 (1922)).
Jardines, 133 S.Ct. at 1415.
Id. at 1416.
Id.
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
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Amendment.123 Jardines rejected such a characterization, arguing
that the cases forbidding inquiry into subjective intent held only that
“a stop or search that is objectively reasonable is not vitiated by the
fact that the officer’s real reason for making the stop or search has
nothing to do with the validating reason.”124 In contrast, the question
in Jardines was “whether the officer’s conduct was an objectively
reasonable search” in the first place.125
The Court ultimately ruled that Franky’s visit was a search
because Jardines himself never gave an implied license to enter his
porch to sniff for drugs.126 To reach this result, Jardines eschewed
Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy analysis, adopted Jones’s
recent return to a property-rights test, and opened the Fourth
Amendment up to discussions of licenses for entry and the subjective
purposes of intruding officers. Thus, the Court, in returning to the
hoped-for clarity of a physical trespass, created a host of new issues
for future courts to consider.
IV. CONCERNS CREATED BY JARDINES
A. By Refusing to Consider a Canine Sniff’s Impact on the
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy of a Home, Jardines Failed to
Eliminate the Inconsistencies Between Kyllo and Place
The Jardines Court congratulated itself on its efficiency in
avoiding Katz’s “expectation of privacy” issue when analyzing a
canine sniff of the home.127 The Court exulted, “One virtue of the
Fourth Amendment’s property-rights baseline is that it keeps easy
cases easy.”128 Such an approach left police and courts with the

123. The Fourth Amendment provides in part: “The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
124. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1416.
125. Id. at 1417.
126. See id. at 1417, where in answer to the question “whether the officers had an implied
license to enter the porch, which in turn depends upon the purpose for which they entered,” the
Court concluded, “Here, [the officers’] behavior objectively revealed a purpose to conduct a
search, which is not what anyone would think he had license to do.” See also id. at 1415, in which
the Court, in assessing the officers’ physical intrusion on “the constitutionally protected extension
of Jardines’ home,” declared, “the only question is whether he had given his leave (even
implicitly) for them to do so. He had not.”
127. Id. at 1417.
128. Id.
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nagging inconsistency between Kyllo and Place that will sow
confusion when assessing canine sniff cases. The Jardines Court
missed an opportunity to revisit some troubling assumptions
underlying Place’s determination that a police dog’s sniff was not a
search.
The Place Court reached some curious conclusions about canine
sniffs. While acknowledging that “a person possesses a privacy
interest in the contents of personal luggage that is protected by the
Fourth Amendment,” Place still found a canine sniff identifying
some of the contents of that luggage—cocaine—to be an act that did
not amount to a Fourth Amendment search.129 Even though the
government was indeed gaining information from the canine sniff,
the information apparently was not of a kind that could be
legitimately kept private from the government. Since the information
only concerned the existence of contraband, an item illegal to
possess in the first place, it intruded on no privacy expectation that
was “legitimate.”130 If a “legitimate expectation” was the equivalent
of Katz’s “reasonable expectation,” then it could be argued that there
was no intrusion on a “reasonable expectation of privacy,” and
therefore no Fourth Amendment search. Further, Place found that the
manner of obtaining this information was less objectionable than that
of a human being rummaging through luggage. The Place Court was
so impressed with the dog’s ability to seek his quarry without
opening bags and exposing them to public view and the luggage
owner’s attendant embarrassment and inconvenience, that it deemed
this less intrusive “search” to be no search at all.131
Place’s assumptions regarding the kind of information revealed
by a dog sniff are dubious. Justice Harlan’s rule in Katz required that
the privacy expectation for a search “be one that society is prepared
to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”132 In a wide variety of cases following
Katz, the Court devotedly adhered to this formulation by explicitly
focusing on whether a “reasonable” privacy expectation existed.133 In
129. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
130. Id. at 707–06.
131. Id. at 707.
132. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
133. E.g., Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 337 (2000) (measuring the reasonable
expectation of privacy against physical manipulation of carryon luggage); California v. Ciraolo,
476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986) (assessing whether there was a reasonable expectation of privacy from
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cases where the Court did mention both “reasonable” and
“legitimate,” it used these terms interchangeably, as when it noted in
Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, “Dow plainly has a reasonable,
legitimate, and objective expectation of privacy within the interior of
its covered buildings.”134 Place, however, distanced “legitimate”
from “reasonable” by distinguishing between contraband, which the
dog is meant to detect, and noncontraband, which the sniff “does not
expose.”135 Place explicitly lauded the dog’s ability to limit its
investigation by content, noting that the sniff disclosed only whether
narcotics were present.136 Place’s novel use of “legitimate” switched
the focus from Katz’s question of whether a person concealed the
contents of his bag or “knowingly expose[d] it to the public,”137 to
whether the contents of the bag were something a person was not
supposed to have in the first place. In shifting focus, Place had
forgotten that “[t]he door of a court is not barred because the plaintiff
has committed a crime.”138 The Fourth Amendment “provides no
exception in its guarantee of protection,” for “[i]ts benefits are
illusory indeed if they are denied to persons who may have been
convicted with the evidence gathered by the very means which the
Amendment forbids.”139 The Fourth Amendment “extends to all
alike, worthy and unworthy, without distinction,” because “[r]ights
intended to protect all must be extended to all, lest they so fall into

observations from a plane flying over a yard); New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106, 114 (1986)
(weighing the reasonable privacy expectations in a vehicle’s VIN number); Maryland v. Macon,
472 U.S. 463, 469 (1985) (considering reasonable privacy expectations in an adult book store);
Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984) (contemplating the reasonableness of privacy
expectations in an open field); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (debating the
reasonableness of privacy expectation in a damaged package of freight); Michigan v. Clifford,
464 U.S. 287, 292 (1984) (considering the reasonable expectation of privacy in fire-damaged
premises); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983) (assessing the reasonable privacy
expectations of a person being tracked on public streets by use of a beeper); Couch v. United
States, 409 U.S. 322, 336 (1973) (looking at the reasonableness of privacy in tax records).
134. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 236 (1986). See also Smith v. Maryland,
442 U.S. 735, 743 (1979) (in which the Court referred to both a “reasonable” and “legitimate”
expectation of privacy).
135. Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
136. Id.
137. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
138. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 484 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
139. Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 142 (1942) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
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desuetude in the course of denying them to the worst of men as to
afford no aid to the best of men in time of need.”140
Another concern raised by Place’s assumptions regarded the
manner in which a dog sniff revealed information about the contents
of a container. Place measured the intrusion a dog causes when he or
she sniffs a bag by contrasting it with the more intrusive human
rummage of luggage.141 Place’s logic boiled down to the notion that,
although a dog does commit a limited intrusion on a bag, it is
certainly less offensive than the prospect of a human fumbling
through luggage and exposing it to the public for embarrassment and
humiliation.142 The problem with Place’s analysis was its frame of
reference—the Court chose to contrast the dog’s sniffing with a
greater intrusion, when it should have analyzed it in terms of the
Fourth Amendment baseline, which is no intrusion at all. The Fourth
Amendment is a command that government not act unless and until it
can offer some basic protections such as reasonableness and, in some
circumstances, a warrant. It explicitly warns that people have a right
“against unreasonable searches and seizures” and mandates this
protection “shall not be violated.”143 In Jardines, the Court lauded
the Olmstead rule as a “simple baseline.”144 The Fourth
Amendment’s true baseline is much more basic—“the right to be let
alone.”145 Place should have measured the canine’s intrusion against
this fundamental right to be free from government interference in the
first place.
Place’s problems surfaced in Jardines when they collided with
Kyllo’s “right of a man to retreat into his own home.”146 If a canine
sniff was so surgically precise that it only obtained information about
contraband—something that should not be possessed in the first
place, and if reliance upon a dog’s nose did not even amount to a
Fourth Amendment search, then a dog’s visit to the front porch of a
home should cause no consternation for the Court. On the other
hand, what Franky told his handler was more than nothing. The
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Id.
Place, 462 U.S. at 707.
Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added).
Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013).
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001).
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canine provided the government with information about the contents
of a home—the “core” of the Fourth Amendment.147
This is the quandary Jardines sidestepped in keeping easy cases
easy.148 Of course, the very fact that the Court recognized the bind
exposes the conflict between two lines of its precedent. The Court
has effectively told police and courts that although Place and Kyllo
are in fundamental conflict, they should continue to apply both as
Constitutional gospel until the problem is solved. Government
officials are tasked with treating dogs as Fourth Amendment
nonentities until they cross into a “constitutionally protected area,”
once criticized by Katz as an incantation.149 Jardines, in spite of
Katz’s efforts, has made a “constitutionally protected area” a
“talisman” that can transform the legal nature of man’s best friend.150
B. Jardines’s Injection of Implied License Rules into Its
Property-Rights Analysis Will Create Confusion for
Criminal Justice Officials
The Jardines Court refined its property rights definition of a
Fourth Amendment search with a discussion of “unlicensed physical
intrusion.”151 To interpret license law, the Court turned to two cases,
McKee v. Gratz,152 and Breard v. Alexandria.153 McKee was a 1922
civil case in which a landowner sued the defendant for removing
mussels “taken alive from the bottom of what seems to have been at
times a flowing stream, at times a succession of pools.”154 To
determine whether the defendant trespassed on the plaintiff’s land
when he took the mussels, the McKee Court noted, “The strict rule of
the English common law as to entry upon a close must be taken to be
mitigated by common understanding with regard to the large
expanses of unenclosed and uncultivated land in many parts at least
of this country.”155 In such lands, “it is customary to wander, shoot

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id.
Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1417.
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967).
Id. at 352, n.9.
Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1415.
McKee v. Gratz, 260 U.S. 127 (1922).
Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
McKee, 260 U.S. at 135.
Id. at 136.
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and fish at will until the owner sees fit to prohibit it.”156 In the
context of such wandering, hunting, and fishing, a “license may be
implied from the habits of the country.” Although McKee concluded
that evidence existed that the collection of muscles was a “practice
[that] had prevailed in this region,” the Court left it to the jury to
decide whether those who took the mussels were entitled to rely on
such an implied license and “whether, if entitled to rely upon it for
occasional uses, they could do so to the extent of the considerable
and systematic work that was done.”157 Thus, while McKee
mentioned a rule regarding an implied license and suggested it be
interpreted by reference to the “habits of the country,” it did not
perform this analysis, and therefore offered little guidance on
applying implied license law to facts.
Breard offered facts much closer to those in Jardines, for it
involved a door-to-door salesman who was arrested for soliciting
magazine subscriptions in violation of an ordinance requiring “prior
consent of the owners of the residences solicited.”158 The Breard
Court apparently disfavored salesmen knocking on doors, for it
refused to allow solicitors, whom it deemed “opportunists[] for
private gain,”159 to “arm themselves with an acceptable principle”
and “proceed to use it as an iron standard to smooth their path by
crushing the living rights of others to privacy and repose.”160 Breard
concluded, “This case calls for an adjustment of constitutional rights
in the light of the particular living conditions of the time and
place.”161 The Court then described the various, and to it unwelcome,
changes in living conditions occasioned by the boom in door-to-door
sales:
Door-to-door canvassing has flourished increasingly in
recent years with the ready market furnished by the rapid
concentration of housing. The infrequent and still welcome
solicitor to the rural home became to some a recurring
nuisance in towns when the visits were multiplied.
Unwanted knocks on the door by day or night are a
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id.
Id.
Breard, 341 U.S. at 624.
Id. at 625.
Id. at 626.
Id.
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nuisance, or worse, to peace and quiet. The local retail
merchant, too, has not been unmindful of the effective
competition furnished by house-to-house selling in many
lines. As a matter of business fairness, it may be thought not
really sporting to corner the quarry in his home and through
his open door put pressure on the prospect to purchase. As
the exigencies of trade are not ordinarily expected to have a
higher rating constitutionally than the tranquility of the
fireside, responsible municipal officers have sought a way
to curb the annoyances while preserving complete freedom
for desirable visitors to the homes.162
Breard held the ordinance prohibiting such sales without prior
consent did not violate due process163 because, “The Constitution’s
protection of property rights does not make a state or a city impotent
to guard its citizens against the annoyances of life because the
regulation may restrict the manner of doing a legitimate business.”164
The Court in Jardines read Breard as allowing “solicitors, hawkers,
and peddlers of all kinds” so long as they “approach the home by the
front path, knock promptly, wait briefly to be received, and then
(absent invitation to linger longer) leave.”165 Since “introducing a
trained police dog to explore the area around the home in hopes of
discovering incriminating evidence” exceeded this “traditional
invitation,” it fell outside the implied license.166
Broad language plucked from a mussel-poaching case and a
decision from a time when door-to-door sales were a disturbing new
phenomenon provide little guidance for police and courts attempting
to apply Jardines’s newly-minted license rules under the Fourth
Amendment. Further, Jardines’s own ruling provided scant direction
beyond conclusory statements about the offensiveness of dogs
sniffing within the curtilage.167 Thus, Jardines created a new Fourth
162. Id. at 626–27.
163. Id. at 633.
164. Id. at 632.
165. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1415 (2013).
166. Id. at 1415–16.
167. Jardines’s reference to “background social norms” may provide a clue as to a way
forward. Id. Ironically, a rule that frequently refers to social norms and habits of the country is
Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy definition of a search. Although Jardines, in exalting the
simplicity of its “baseline” property-rights test, meant to distinguish its rule from the standard in
Katz, in crafting an “implied license” limit, the Court might have unwittingly brought in much of
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Amendment rule without providing any manual on how it works to
those who will enforce it. Jardines complicated matters further by
adding to its license test an entirely separate element regarding the
subjective intent of the officer.168 Specifically, the Court decided that
the “scope of a license—express or implied—is limited not only to a
particular area but also to a specific purpose.”169 The full
implications of this subjective analysis will be explored in the next
section.
C. Jardines Doubled Down on Jones’s “Purpose” Inquiry,
Multiplying the Flaws of Its Property-Rights Test
In fleshing out its property-rights test, Jardines relied on the
subjective intent of the officer to inform to two distinct inquiries: 1)
the application of Jones’s definition of a Fourth Amendment
“search,”170 and 2) the determination of the scope of a license to
enter a homeowner’s property.171 For the first inquiry, Jardines
adopted Jones’s definition of a Fourth Amendment “search”172: a
physical occupation by government of private property “for the
purpose of obtaining information.”173 Such subjectivity has received
rough treatment from the Court in the past. The Court has
Katz’s analytical tools through the back door. Id. at 1414. In other words, if Jardines offered a
test based on property rights that was informed by reference to societal norms, Katz offered a
societal norm test (what one could reasonably expect to be private) that was interpreted at times
by reference to property rights. In applying the Katz standard in Rakas v. Illinois, the Court
declared,
Legitimation of expectations of privacy by law must have a source outside of the
Fourth Amendment, either by reference to concepts of real or personal property law or
to understandings that are recognized and permitted by society. One of the main rights
attaching to property is the right to exclude others…and one who owns or lawfully
possesses or controls property will in all likelihood have a legitimate expectation of
privacy by virtue of his right to exclude.
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 144 n.12 (1978). In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell echoed
this point, noting, “[P]roperty rights reflect society’s explicit recognition of a person’s authority
to act as he wishes in certain areas, and therefore should be considered in determining whether an
individuals’ expectations of privacy are reasonable.” Id. at 153 (Powell, J., concurring).
Moreover, Justice Marshall noted that a factor considered in determining the reasonableness of a
privacy expectation is “whether the expectation at issue is rooted in entitlements defined in
positive law,” such as property law. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 189–90 (1983).
168. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1416.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1414.
171. Id. at 1416.
172. Id. at 1414.
173. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012).
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emphatically declared, “[T]he subjective intent of the law
enforcement officer is irrelevant in determining whether that
officer’s actions violate the Fourth Amendment . . . the issue is not
his state of mind, but the objective effect of his actions.”174 A
particular act is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment “regardless
of the individual officer’s state of mind, ‘as long as the
circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the] action.’”175 Since
subjective motivations “have no bearing,”176 are “irrelevant,”177 and
are “of no moment,”178 any argument proposing that the actual
motivation of officers affects “constitutional reasonableness” has
been foreclosed.179 The Court’s adamancy here is based on sound
reasoning:
The reasons for looking to objective factors, rather than
subjective intent, are clear. Legal tests based on
reasonableness are generally objective, and this Court has
long taken the view that “evenhanded law enforcement is
best achieved by the application of objective standards of
conduct, rather than standards that depend upon the
subjective state of mind of the officer.”180
The Court has deemed such an objective standard “imperative”
because an “officer’s evil intentions will not make a Fourth
Amendment violation out of an objectively reasonable use of force;
nor will an officer’s good intentions make an objectively
unreasonable use of force constitutional.”181
When the Jardines Court was presented with its holdings
deeming subjective intent irrelevant, it aimed to distinguish them as
involving a separate issue.182 Jardines characterized Whren as
“merely hold[ing] that a stop or search that is objectively reasonable

174. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 404 (2006) (quoting Bond v. United States, 529
U.S. 334, 338 n.2 (2000)).
175. Id. (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978)).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 266 (1973); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S.
218, 236 (1973).
179. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 814 (1996).
180. Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1859 (2011) (citing Horton v. California, 496 U.S.
128, 138 (1990)).
181. Graham v. O’Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989).
182. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1416 (2013).
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is not vitiated by the fact that the officer’s real reason for making the
stop or search has nothing to do with the validating reason.”183
Unlike Whren, the Court in Jardines had to decide “whether the
officer’s conduct was an objectively reasonable search.”184
The problem that Jardines cannot avoid, however, is the simple
fact that both the earlier caselaw and Jardines are assessing whether
an officer was acting in an objectively reasonable manner. As we
have seen, nearly forty years of caselaw has explicitly rejected any
consideration of an officer’s inner thoughts when weighing the
Fourth Amendment reasonableness of official action. For an example
of the bind Jardines had placed itself in, one need look no further
than the facts of Jardines. Walking a dog, even up to someone’s
porch, is perfectly reasonable. The common law lacks even “a single
case holding that a visitor to the front door of a home commits a
trespass if the visitor is accompanied by a dog.”185 The “traditional
protections against unreasonable searches and seizures afforded by
the common law at the time of the framing” has previously carried
great weight with the Court because “an examination of the
common-law understanding of an officer’s authority” can shed “light
on the obviously relevant, if not entirely dispositive, consideration of
what the Framers of the Amendment might have thought to be
reasonable.”186
Walking a dog to the front door can only become unreasonable
using Jardines’s intent analysis. The deeper inquiry—what, exactly,
is the purpose for the dog’s presence, and why did the person bring
the dog to the door—unmasks the true nature of the government
action. One could argue that such questions should be perfectly
proper areas of inquiry, but they directly conflict with the prohibition
against subjectivity that the Court has imposed on Fourth
Amendment litigation. If Jardines wished to include such subjective
investigation in the Fourth Amendment, it should have openly
admitted the significant change it was making. Concern for the

183. Id.
184. Id. at 1416–17.
185. Id. at 1424 (Alito, J., dissenting).
186. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 326 (2000) (citing Payton v. New York,
445 U.S. 573, 591 (1980)).
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officials burdened with carrying out criminal investigations on a
daily basis demands such clarity and forthrightness.
Moreover, Jardines caused subjectivity to take on even more
importance than it had in Jones by having it inform a newly added
second inquiry—license to enter property. The Court declared that
the “scope of a license—express or implied—is limited not only to a
particular area but also to a specific purpose.”187 This doubling down
on subjective intent came in spite of the Court’s condemnation of
subjectivity as late as 2011 in the case Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd,188 which
explained:
We ask whether “the circumstances, viewed objectively,
justify [the challenged] action.” If so, that action was
reasonable “whatever the subjective intent” motivating the
relevant officials. This approach recognizes that the Fourth
Amendment regulates conduct rather than thoughts, and it
promotes evenhanded, uniform enforcement of the law.189
Jardines, in the face of clear language declaring that what
matters for Fourth Amendment analysis is “conduct rather than
thoughts,” then proceeded to measure an official conduct by
thoughts.
The errant turn to subjectivity could accordingly cost Jardines
evenhanded enforcement of the Fourth Amendment because of the
great difficulty in divining the real intent of government actors.
Creative officers will waste little time in inventing ways to
circumvent the “purpose” part of the license analysis. Police could
walk drug-detecting canines on residential streets, claiming to be
introducing the police dogs to neighborhood children or to be
sniffing out contraband stashes left in public by street sellers who do
not wish to be found holding contraband. Since the curtilage of many
homes can be quite small, due to “the rapid concentration of
housing” the Breard Court described,190 dogs could detect
contraband by passing by some curtilage’s outer limits. This

187. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1416.
188. 131 S. Ct. 2074 (2011).
189. Id. at 2080 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
190. Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 626–27 (1951) (abrogated by Vill. of Schaumburg
v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620 (1980)).
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possibility would be particularly prevalent for those who live in lowincome housing, where yard size can be modest.
The resulting canine sniffs of curtilage might fall outside of both
the Jardines/Jones property-rights definition of a search and Katz’s
reasonable expectation of privacy test. After Jardines, the Court
would find no physical trespass on a constitutionally protected
area—and hence no search—since none of the canine’s four feet
actually invaded the curtilage.191 Katz would likely find no search as
well, due to a combination of the pass Place gave dogs (in deeming
their sniffs not to constitute a Fourth Amendment “search”)192 and
the Court’s over-flights precedent.193 In the over-flight cases of
California v. Ciraolo194 and Florida v. Riley,195 the Court failed to
protect the curtilage, even though it described this area as “intimately
linked to the home” and a haven for the “protection of families and
personal privacy.”196 In Ciraolo, the Court deemed an officer’s
naked-eye observation of marijuana from a plane flying over
curtilage not to constitute a Fourth Amendment search.197 One of the
reasons given for this lack of Fourth Amendment protection of
curtilage was that police acted “in a physically nonintrusive
manner.”198 While a homeowner’s curtilage was protected from an
officer stepping on curtilage, “it is unreasonable for [a homeowner]
to expect that his marijuana plants were constitutionally protected
from being observed with the naked eye from an altitude of 1,000
feet.”199 The Court followed the same reasoning three years later in
Riley, where it found another government collection of evidence
involving “no physical invasion”200 of curtilage not to be a Fourth
Amendment search.201
According to Ciraolo and Riley, a dog sniffing around for
evidence, even if detecting information inside the cherished
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.

Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1415.
United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
476 U.S. 207 (1986).
488 U.S. 445 (1989).
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 213.
Id. at 218.
Id. at 213.
Id. at 218.
Riley, 488 U.S. at 449.
Id. at 451.
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curtilage, would not trigger Fourth Amendment protection so long as
he or she does not physically touch protected land. While Ciraolo
and Riley gathered information in an intimate area from the
physically nonintrusive sense of sight, the canine would gather such
information with the physically nonintrusive sense of smell. The
incongruity of condemning a canine sniff of a home while ignoring
the same intrusion of the curtilage—an area that shares the intimacies
of the home—is a vestige of Jardines’s failure to resolve the inherent
conflict between Kyllo and Place. This failure, in turn, is exacerbated
by Jardines’s recourse to subjectivity.
V. CONCLUSION
During World War II, the Court, in Goldman v. United States,202
decided an electronic surveillance issue by applying Olmstead’s
physical trespass test.203 In Goldman, federal investigators placed a
“detectaphone”—essentially an electronic bug—against a wall in
order to overhear conversations in the office next door.204 The Court
held that “the use of the detectaphone by Government agents was not
a violation of the Fourth Amendment.”205 When asked to overrule
Olmstead, Goldman refused, declaring that “[t]o rehearse and
reappraise the arguments pro and con, and the conflicting views
exhibited in the opinions, would serve no good purpose.”206
This weary refusal to assess the privacy implications of
electronic eavesdropping came two decades before the Court’s
historic decision in Katz. Some members of the Court, however, had
already recognized the independent significance of privacy for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment. In his dissent, Justice Murphy
identified as “[o]ne of the great boons secured to the inhabitants of
this country” the “right of personal privacy guaranteed by the Fourth
Amendment.”207 Mindful of the terrible cost to the country of the
global war then raging, he noted that,
At a time when the nation is called upon to give freely of
life and treasure to defend and preserve the institutions of
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

316 U.S. 129 (1942), overruled in part by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
Id. at 135.
Id. at 131–32.
Id. at 135.
Id. at 136.
Id. at 136 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
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democracy and freedom, we should not permit any of the
essentials of freedom to lose vitality through legal
interpretations that are restrictive and inadequate for the
period in which we live.208
The Jardines Court, in choosing to decide a Fourth Amendment
case by focusing on property rights rather than resolving pressing
questions of privacy, failed to heed Justice Murphy’s warning. By
returning to a Fourth Amendment doctrine that Justice Murphy
warned, back in 1942, might “become obsolete,”209 Jardines did not
keep “easy cases easy.”210 Instead, the Jardines Court left unresolved
a glaring incongruity between Kyllo, precedent which exalted the
privacy of the home, and Place, a case that deemed a canine sniff to
be a Fourth Amendment nonentity. Further, Jardines grafted an
undefined and potentially complicated implied license analysis211
onto its property-rights test, a rule that it esteemed as a “simple
baseline.”212 Finally, Jardines intensified the subjectivity of Jones’s
property-rights rule by injecting a “purpose” analysis into its new
license rule.213 Future police and courts, burdened with trying to
apply Jardines’s rule, will hardly agree that the Court kept their tasks
easy.

208.
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213.

Id. at 142.
Id. at 138.
Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1417 (2013).
Id. at 1415–16.
Id. at 1414.
Id. at 1416–17.

